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1 Introduction
The medical miracles represented by organ transplantation and immune-suppression therapy have
saved hundreds of thousands of lives over the last thirty years.1 While many patients have enjoyed
life-altering improvements in health and longevity, hundreds of thousands more have been unable to
take advantage of these great achievements of science because of a chronic and worsening shortage
of organs for transplantation. While numerous organs exhibit some degree of shortage, the case of
kidneys is by far the most severe in the U.S. and abroad. Public funding of hemodialysis treatment
for virtually all patients suﬀering from End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) in the U.S., Europe, and
in most other high-income countries has allowed the waiting-lists for kidney transplants to grow
year after year.2 As of August, 2009, the oﬃcial U.S. kidney waiting list, maintained by the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), had reached about 81,000 patients, while an
additional 2,200 were waiting for kidney-pancreas transplants.3 These figures vastly understate the
significance of the shortage, however: 6,238 patients were removed from the oﬃcial list in 2008
due to reasons of death (4,558) or deteriorating health (1680). Beard, Jackson, and Kaserman
(2008) estimate that cumulative deaths on the U.S. list alone, since 1982, will exceed deaths from
the Hiroshima bomb of WWII by 2010.4 Further, dialysis itself is incredibly expensive, running
around $72,000 per year in direct care costs per patient, and over 300,000 patients are currently
receiving dialysis therapy under the Medicare program in the U.S. Long-term dialysis care has
numerous severe medical consequences, and dialysis reduces the patient’s prospects for a successful
transplant.5
1Extensive reviews of the U.S. experience are available in Kaserman and Barnett (2002) and Goodwin (2006).
2Most countries have national authorities that maintain the “oﬃcial” waiting list statistics. In the U.S., OPTN
does this task. Supernational organizations such as Eurotransplant and Scandiatransplant maintain waiting lists
that combine diﬀerent national populations. OECD health statistics include census counts of dialysis populations
and kidney transplantation. Data on U.S. dialysis programs is compiled by the United States Renal Disease System
(USRDS).
3There are many more kidney dialysis patients than there are patients on the kidney transplant waiting list. This
is because admission to the waiting list requires a variety of medical and social criteria be met. However, the waiting
list itself does reflect, to some extent, the severity of the shortage, although on medical grounds it clearly understates
it.
4U.S. deaths on the list vastly understate deaths from the shortage due to sickness removals.
5Steinbuch (2009) provides a concise summary of the main negative consequences of dialysis.
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The organ procurement systems of virtually all countries except Iran share a few common
features which have resulted in the current severe shortage of organs.6 First, almost all nations
prohibit compensation for organ donors, whether those donors are living (as can be done in the case
of kidneys, for example), or deceased (“cadaveric”), as is necessary for many organs such as hearts
or intestines. Second, living donors of kidneys (who surpassed cadaver donors for the first time in
the U.S. in 2001) are generally required to have a stable, long-term private relationship with the
recipient, such as kinship. Donations “to the waiting list” are generally prohibited, or else made
quite diﬃcult, in an eﬀort to avoid paid donation disguised as altruism. In contrast, donations
from cadavers must be anonymous, and ordinarily the families of deceased donors are not allowed
to designate the patient to receive any harvested organs. Neither living nor deceased donors, nor
their families, can receive compensation (the National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984 in the
U.S. makes any such deal a felony), and indeed there is some evidence that living donors are not
even compensated for their costs, broadly speaking.7
Because of the huge costs of the shortage of kidneys, and the life-or-death nature of this problem,
the evolution of the kidney transplant waiting list, and the complex roles played by living and
deceased donors in this process, is of great public interest. In broad terms, the waiting list for
renal grafts is composed of those individuals who are admitted to the list by transplant centers
using both medical and non-medical criteria. Not all patients who suﬀer from ESRD are viable
candidates for transplantation.8 Kidneys for transplant are obtained from deceased donors who
meet relatively strict medical criteria: such persons are ordinarily disease free adults under the age
of 60, who suﬀer brain-death in a hospital setting that allows their vital functions to be maintained
pending organ removal. Such removals require family consent, and that consent is often not given.9
Alternately, living donation is feasible and relatively low-risk in the case of kidneys, although it is
6 Iran pays living donors under a state-administered system, and it has no waiting list for kidneys. See Ghods
(2002).
7See Reilly et al. (1997) and Clarke et al. (2006).
8Estimates vary, but perhaps about 40% of dialysis patients in the U.S. are, on purely medical grounds, viable
candidates. This number exceeds the waiting list y a substantial amount. See Barnett and Kaserman (2002), Ch. 2,
for a discussion of the demand and supply for transplants.
9 In the U.S., the “conversion rate” hovers around 50%. See Matas (2004).
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generally necessary for patients to find a willing and compatible donor from among their family and
closest friends.10 The waiting list is sometimes described as being primarily composed of persons
waiting for a cadaveric organ from a stranger, since most patients needing kidney transplants are
advised to try to find a willing living donor at their initial diagnosis.
Many programs, with varying but modest degrees of success, have been implemented over
the years in an attempt to increase the numbers of transplants performed.11 Because altruism
plays a fundamental role in the current system, the motivations of potential organ donors, and
their families, are topics of great public moment. Since the families of brain-dead potential donors
cannot legally be oﬀered compensation for donation, they must be persuaded by other, less tangible
means. Similarly, potential living donors , when faced with the critical medical need of a relative
or close acquaintance, must decide whether the nontrivial personal costs of living donation are
outweighed by the benefits.12 Because these decisions are, in principle, uninfluenced by money,
they are likely to be impacted by considerations directly related to the prospects of the patients
involved, the degree of the shortage, and the extent to which the potential donor decision-makers
view the current system as honest and fair. This paper identifies two such eﬀects, uses a rigorous
time-series analysis to look for them, and confirms the existence of one, while raising doubts about
the reality of the other.
Our goal here is to examine two potential phenomena, discussed by those in the transplant
community, which are potentially extremely important for any eﬀort at reform within the current
altruistic paradigm. First, because living donor and deceased donor kidneys are fairly good (but not
perfect) substitutes, the question naturally arises as to whether increases in the cadaveric supply
will displace living donor organs and, if so, to what degree? This phenomenon is plausible for
several reasons. Because a living donor must consider making a very profound sacrifice to provide
10See Matas (2004) for statistics on living donation. OPTN also publishes annual figures on the relationships
between living donors and recipients. Around 98% of donors give to relatives, close friends, or do so indirectly
through paired exchanges.
11Beard and Kaserman (2006) provide a list. These innovations include mandated request, public service advertis-
ing, donor cards, paired exchange systems, presumed consent laws, and so on.
12 It is quite likely that many living donors face “nonmarket” incentives to donate, and payments made within the
family setting are quite beyond the ability of the Law to regulate.
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a loved one with a donor organ, the prospects of that patient receiving a cadaver organ from
another source directly aﬀect the net benefit of making a living donation. In general, one would
expect less enthusiasm from living donors when cadaver donations are relatively more plentiful.
Further, because the UNOS algorithm will always make transplant matches that are genetically
very favorable (matching six of six antigens), any patient on the waiting list has a chance to receive
a very good match from a cadaver at any time, although this probability is small. Finally, one may
take the view, common in the medical community, that living donation is ethically inferior, from
the social perspective, and should be regarded as “second-best” , as it involves the violation of a
healthy body. Thus, many see living donation as a symptom of desperation: if there were suﬃcient
deceased donor kidneys, we could reduce or perhaps eliminate reliance on living donors.
A second issue, only recently introduced into the literature on the organ shortage by German
economist Rigmar Osterkamp, refers to the eﬀects of living donations on the willingness of bereaved
families to allow deceased donations.13 In particular, numerous press reports in the U.S. and abroad
have described illegal “kidney deals”, in which living donors are recruited from poor countries
and paid to masquerade as willing, altruistic relatives. The existence of such schemes, which is
undeniable but of quite uncertain magnitude, is often believed to undermine the eﬀorts of legitimate
national organ procurement agencies. Families of potential deceased donors come to believe that
they are asked to make a gift, while other donors are paid, often huge sums, to provide organs for
favored, wealthy patients. Osterkamp termed the resulting negative eﬀect on cadaveric donation
“dirty altruism”, and sought to identify the phenomenon in a panel data set of OECD countries,
but without success.
In this paper, we analyze time series data for U.S. kidney transplantation activities and the
kidney waiting list in an attempt to isolate and identify these two eﬀects. We are particularly
interested in the substitution eﬀect between living and cadaver donor transplants, because the ex-
13Osterkamp (2006) introduces this concept, and relates it to the donor analysis of Barnett, Beard, and Kaserman
(1993). Osterkamp remarks, “However, there seems to be a growing awareness in the medical community, at least in
Germany, that living donation may have only a small or even adverse net eﬀect on total donation.” (Osterkamp, p.3,
note 1)
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istence of such eﬀects would be quite important in any evaluation of the likelihood of relieving the
shortage using increased numbers of cadaver donors. In particular, the Organ Donation Break-
through Collaborative (ODBC), a recent eﬀort aimed at increasing the success rate for obtaining
deceased donor organs, presupposes that an additional deceased donor kidney transplant is simply
a one unit net increase in the number of transplants performed.14 However, if such an increase
leads to a significant reduction in subsequent living donor transplant levels, the potential ability of
the ODBC to reduce the shortage and save lives will be undermined. Similarly, the possible exis-
tence of dirty altruism could also present serious constraints on reform eﬀorts, since the percentage
of patients receiving living donor transplants has grown enormously throughout the world as the
shortages have worsened in most countries. If increases in living donation reduce later cadaveric
transplants, a vicious cycle arises which causes the entire transplant system to falter.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a concise background description. Section
3 presents our econometric model and estimation results. A concluding section describes the import
of the results for organ supply reform eﬀorts, and suggests further issues.
2 Background: Kidney Procurement and Transplantation in the
U.S.
About eighteen patients die each day in the U.S. as a direct result of the shortage of kidneys for
transplantation.15 Hundreds of thousands endure the extremely diﬃcult regime of hemodialysis,
spending typically 14-20 hours per week hooked up to dialysis machines, suﬀering the profound
aftereﬀects of dialysis therapy, or remaining at home, unable to work due to high rates of hos-
pitalization, depression, and suicide.16 Over twenty billion dollars are spent by the U.S. federal
14This conclusion is implicit in the discussion, but this sentiment is more explicit in other, related discussions, such
as Gjertson and Cecka (2000).
15This is probably a large underestimate since very sick persons are never even placed on the list. As mentioned
earlier, though, there were about 6,238 removals from the U.S. Kidney list in 2008 dues to death or sickness. There
were many more deaths of dialysis patients, but of course not all of those persons would be valid candidates for
transplantation.
16A vivid description of the lives of dialysis patients is in Perez-Pena (2006).
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authorities annually on direct payments for dialysis treatment, transplantation, and related activi-
ties (Health & Human Services, 2008). Numerous studies have shown that kidney transplant action
is the best treatment for many patients with ESRD, and that such transplants are extremely cost-
eﬀective for public health budgets, often “paying for themselves” in as little as 9-18 months.17 No
one argues that a large increase in the rate of renal transplantation is undesirable: serious debate
focuses solely on the best means of achieving this goal, and whether donor compensation should be
used in the eﬀort.
In the U.S., as in many other countries, the procurement of organs for transplantation is, legally
speaking, a solely public function. In the U.S., the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS)
operates the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), created by Congress in
the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984. Designated regional authorities- the Organ
Procurement Organizations or OPOs- have monopoly rights to collect organs within their regions.
UNOS operates as a central clearinghouse for organs, using a complicated algorithm to match
donated organs with those seeking transplants and registered on the waiting lists. Unlike many
European countries, OPOs and large transplant centers have at least some autonomy, and control
admissions to the waiting lists at their facilities. In principle, though, organs are matched to
patients primarily on medical criteria, although time on the waiting list is also considered in some
cases. Any hospital wishing to perform transplants and receive Medicare or Medicaid funding must
comply with the UNOS regulations.
Kidneys constitute far and away the primary solid organ transplanted. About 80% of all pa-
tients on the U.S. waiting lists are ESRD patients needing kidney graphs.18 Kidneys are unique
among organs transplanted for two primary reasons. First, living donation is possible, since people
ordinarily have two kidneys, but fare fairly well with only one. Surgery to remove a healthy kidney
is relatively safe.19 Second, the dialyzer, a machine that mimics the function of the kidney, exists
17See Karlberg and Nyberg (2006) for a review.
18As of September, 2009, OPTN reported total waiting list of 103,247, or which 80,975 needed kidneys, 15,928 were
waiting for livers, and the balance needed other organs or multiple organ transplants.
19See Ibrahim et al. (2009).
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and allows ESRD patients to survive for years while awaiting transplant. In the cases of many other
solid organs, such as hearts, livers, or lungs, patient survival expectations on the waiting lists are
quite short, and therefore the waiting lists for those organs are only a fraction of that for kidneys.
Thus, the shortage of kidneys can be regarded as the defining problem for organ transplantation
policy.
Kidneys for transplant are obtained from both living donors and deceased donors. Originally,
the primitive state of immune suppression therapy implied that all transplants had to come from
closely related, living donors, such as twins. With the invention of cyclosporine, cadaver organs
became useful, and transplants from deceased strangers began to occur regularly. Living donors,
however, have remained a vital part of the transplant equation because of the severe shortages of
deceased donor organs of the necessary quality.
Although poorly understood by many people, very few hospital deaths (generally perhaps 1%
or less) occur in conditions that allow transplantation of solid organs. In general, the donor must
be “brain-dead”, a physiological state characterized by the cessation of higher brain activity. The
donor must be generally healthy, free of infections, less than 60 years of age, and so on. As a
result of these traditional requirements, most such donors are victims of suicide, car/motorcycle
wrecks, or strokes. Persons dying of heart attacks, for example, are generally not good sources of
organs, and fewer are used.20 The respiration of the donor is maintained mechanically until the
organs are removed. Thus, the deceased “looks alive”, since he/she continues to breath and often
shows a normal appearance to loved ones untrained in medicine. Unfortunately, these facts lead
many families to refuse donation, even in the presence of a donor card, trained requesters, physician
support, and the terrible need for organs. Around 50% of all standard criteria donor candidates’
families refuse in the U.S., although the rate varies widely among hospitals.21 Clearly, eﬀort by
20The “best” donors are termed “standard criteria donors” (SCD’s), while those donating after cardiac death
(non-heart beating donors, or NHB’s) or with other undesirable traits such as infection or advanced age (so-called
“expanded criteria donors”, or ECD’s) are associated with poorer medical outcomes and higher rates of rejection and
infection. Rudich et al. (2002) provide statistics on the consequences of using NHB donors. In 2005, the U.S. UNOS
hospitals transplanted 5294 SCD kidneys, 2000 ECD organs, and 793 from NHB donors.
21Some hospitals have conversions rates around 10%, while others achieve rates over 80%. These variations are the
basis for the ODBC program of sharing “best practices” among member hospitals. See Shafer et al. (2006).
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hospital staﬀ can aﬀect the success of donation requests, and thus the numbers of deceased donor
transplants. Such transplants are extremely challenging, as there are severe limits on the time that
may pass between removal of an organ and its transplantation into the patient.
In contrast, donations from living donors are quite leisurely aﬀairs. Surgery may be scheduled
for the convenience of all involved. Transplant success rates are higher, ischemic time is extremely
short, and the expected lifetime of the graft is greater, other things equal. Surgeons, from the
purely technical viewpoint, always prefer living donor transplants. The problem, of course, is that,
in contrast to a cadaver, the donor in the living case is a second patient, needing care, post-operative
evaluation, and so on. Such a donor has rights, whereas a cadaver is, under most legal systems, a
special form of property.22
Those persons making a living donation of a kidney are taking a highly significant and irre-
versible step. Although such donation is relatively riskless (statistics suggest a death rate of less
than .05%), there are some consequences. First, surgical evaluation, recovery, and so on will take
weeks to several months. The law is taken to prohibit compensation, even for such costs as these.
General anesthesia is used. After surgery, the donor has only one kidney, which prohibits them from
certain activities, such as joining the military, playing NCAA contact sports, buying certain forms
of insurance, and so on.23 Long-term follow-up studies of donors have thus far found no deleteri-
ous eﬀects from donation, but some physicians express concerns. Finally, living donation requires
a physician to remove a healthy organ from a healthy patient, which is not a treatment for any
disease the patient has, and is sometimes claimed to be mutilation in violation of the Hippocratic
Oath to “do no harm.”
Properly speaking, kidney transplants of either type involve a combination of stochastic events,
combined with choices by both patients and medical oﬃcials. Accidents provide deceased donor
organs. Fortunate genetic matching makes living donation possible. Yet, combined with these
22The Common Law provides for the protection of cadavers from abuse and mutilation. For a legal treatment, see
Goodwin (2006) and Steinbuch (2009).
23The system in Iran, where paid living donation is the rule, provides for insurance benefits and care for donors
precisely due to these sorts of eﬀects. See Ghods (2002).
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events, we also observe conscious choices made by patients, families, medical staﬀ, and various
public oﬃcials. Given the “correct” stochastic events, donors (or their families) must make the
next, necessary step and agree to the donation. Since payment to such persons is prohibited, their
decision calculus is likely to include factors that, in a monetized system of procurement, would be
much less noticeable. In the case of the families of deceased potential donors, the urgency of the
need for organs (which can be communicated to them), and the degree to which they believe the
organ procurement system is fair and humane, may well aﬀect their decision. The eﬀorts of doctors,
although complicated by their financial interests, also presumably reflect such motives. The term
“dirty altruism” has been coined to describe the eﬀect that suspect living donations might have
on the willingness of families to provide cadaveric organs. Sensational press accounts of the sale
of kidneys by living donors, which have become a staple of the popular media as the shortage has
worsened, publicize the facts that some living donors receive very large cash payments.
The problem facing the potential living donor is much more diﬃcult. Such a person may well
feel pressure from family members and friends, albeit perhaps of a nonmonetary sort. If a donor
cares about the patient, then a relevant question would be, “if I do not donate, what is the likely
fate of the patient?”. The answer to this question depends primarily on the probability that a
cadaver organ will become available for the transplant. That, in turn, depends on the numbers of
cadaver transplants and the size of the waiting list.
Thus, we may describe two phenomena that may aﬀect the evolution of the kidney waiting list
and organ donations: the “substitution eﬀect”, and the “dirty altruism” eﬀect. In the substitution
case, if such does occur, one would expect to see a negative impact of cadaver transplants in one
period with living donations in a later period, controlling for the contemporaneous “need” for
transplants, as proxied by the waiting list. The size of this eﬀect would also be quite important,
since it would determine the degree to which increases in cadaver organs will translated into more
total transplants over time.
For the “dirty altruism” eﬀect, one envisions a link between living donations now, and cadaver
donations/transplants later. If this hypothesis is valid, then we should see that living donations
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now negatively impact cadaver transplants later. Further, though, this link almost surely requires
the connivance of the media at large, and that is quite diﬃcult to measure. It appears, however,
that the numbers of reports of black market type transplants in the media is rising since 2000.24
The actual dynamics are likely to be complex, however, and the best we can do here is merely look
for evidence of a linkage between living and deceased donor transplants, recognizing that such a
link, if it exists at all, could be explained in other ways.
We look for these eﬀects using data on the waiting list, and the numbers of transplants performed
within the UNOS system in the U.S. The challenge, however, is evaluating these phenomena in a
statistically credible way, and that is our purpose in the next section.
3 The Econometric Model
Let yt = [lt ct−1 wt−1]0 be a vector of diﬀerence stationary random variables where lt, ct−1,
and wt−1 denote the number of live donor kidney transplants at time t, the number of deceased
donor kidney transplants at time t − 1, and the waiting list for kidney transplants at time t − 1,
respectively, measured in natural logarithms. It should be noted that we include ct−1 and wt−1 in
yt instead of ct and wt, assuming that the potential live donors make their decisions based on the
observed information/data on the number of cadaveric donors and the waiting lists.25
Assume that there is a nonzero vector of real numbers γ = [1 − β0]0, where β =[β1 β]0, such
that γ0yt is stationary, that is, yt is cointegrated with a (normalized) cointegrating vector γ. Then,
the triangular representation (Phillips, 1991) of such a cointegrated vector process is,
lt = α+ β1ct−1 + β2wt−1 + εt (1)
∆xt = δ + ut, (2)
24Cherry (2005) provides some vivid examples.
25As a robustness check, we implemented a cointegrating regression/test with contemporaneous variables. We
found slightly weaker substitution eﬀects but the results were overall qualitatively similar to those of the baseline
model. Further, as our data is quarterly (not annual), one period lags are nearly contemporaneous.
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where ∆xt = [∆ct−1 ∆wt−1]0 is a 2 × 1 vector of diﬀerenced variables, α denotes a constant, δ
is a vector of constants (drifts), εt is zero-mean stationary for β1 and β2, and 2 × 1 vector ut is
zero-mean stationary. We assume that the cointegrating vector γ eliminates both the stochastic
and deterministic trends, thus time trend is not included in the cointegrating regression (1).26
We also investigate the validity of the so-called “Dirty Altruism” model described as follows.
ct = h0dt + β1lt−1 + β2wt−1 + εt (3)
∆xt = δ + ut, (4)
where ∆xt = [∆lt−1 ∆wt−1]0 is a 2× 1 vector of diﬀerenced variables, dt = [1 t]0 denotes a vector
of deterministic terms including time trend, and h is the associated coeﬃcients on the deterministic
terms.27
The ordinary least squares (LS) estimator βˆLS for the cointegrating regression (1) or (3) is
super-consistent as βˆLS converges to the true value at the rate of T (sample size) even when xt is
correlated with εt. However, the asymptotic distribution of βˆLS is asymptotically biased and non-
normal. Therefore, statistical inferences based on the usual LS standard errors are not reliable.
Furthermore, the LS estimator is asymptotically ineﬃcient. Fortunately, there is an array of alter-
native methods such as Johansen’s (1988) Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimation method, the Fully
Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) method by Phillips and Hansen (1990), the Canonical
Cointegrating Regression (CCR) method by Park (1992), and the Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares
(DOLS) estimator by Stock and Watson (1993), which have better asymptotic properties than the
LS estimator.
Here, we employ Park’s (1992) CCR method to estimate the cointegrating vector. The main
idea of the CCR is to implement the LS estimation via transformed variables using the long-run
26This is the case when the deterministic cointegration restriction is satisfied. When the cointegrating vector
eliminates the stochastic trend only, γ0yt is trend stationary. See Ogaki and Park (1998) for details.
27With this specification, we obtained empirical evidence for stochastic cointegration only, that is, the cointegrating
vector eliminates stochastic trend but not a deterministic trend. We therefore include a time trend to the cointegrating
regression equation (3).
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covariance matrix of ηt = [εt ut]0, so that the LS estimator is asymptotically eﬃcient. The CCR is
as eﬃcient as the ML procedure of Johansen but is robust to distributional assumptions because it
is a nonparametric method. The CCR is applicable to more general cases of cointegrating regression
models than the FMOLS.28 Finally, the DOLS is easy to implement but the results may be sensitive
to the choice of numbers of leads and lags. Thus, we view the CCR as appropriate to this problem.
4 Empirical Results
Our data are comprised of quarterly reports of UNOS/OPTN for End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD)
patients admitted to the UNOS kidney transplant waiting list, and renal grafts performed in the
US by centers reporting to UNOS. Observations span from 1992:IV to 2006:II. We noticed strong
seasonality in lt and ct (see Figure 1), so we will implement our empirical analysis with both the
raw data and the seasonally adjusted data.29
As a preliminary analysis, we implement a unit-root test for the level variables and diﬀerenced
variables. We use the conventional Phillips-Perron t test statistics that acquires the long-run vari-
ance nonparametrically. We choose Andrew’s (1991) quadratic spectral kernel with an automatic
bandwidth selection method. Results are reported in Table 1. We find that most level variables
seem nonstationary, while diﬀerenced variables are stationary. The tests accept the null of sta-
tionary for wt and the null of trend stationary for ct. These results, however, don’t seem reliable,
because alternative tests, such as the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the DF-GLS test (Elliott
et al., 1996), accept the null of a unit-root for these variables. The test strongly rejects the null of
a unit-root for all diﬀerenced variables. So, we conclude that all level variables are integrated of
order one.
Next, we estimate the cointegrating vector, testing the null of cointegration at the same time,
for our baseline model (1).30 Park’s (1990, 1992) H(p, q) test accepts the null of deterministic
28For example, the FMOLS can not deal with stochastically cointegrated models with deterministic trend in the
repressors.
29We use the Census X12 method for seasonal adjustment. The source of this seasonality is unknown.
30We use the quadratic spectral kernel with automatic bandwidth selection method to obtain the long-run variance
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cointegration with p-values of 0.603 and 0.246 for the raw data and for the seasonally adjusted
data, respectively.31 It is desirable to test the null of cointegration instead of the null of no
cointegration (e.g., Phillips-Ouliaris test), especially when one is interested in testing an economic
model that implies cointegrating relations because one can then control the probability (size) of
rejecting the model. The coeﬃcient estimates for ct−1 are negative, as expected, and significant at
the 5% significance level. The variable wt−1 has strong and significant positive eﬀects on lt.
Finally, we investigate the validity of the model (3). Unlike the results of our baseline model,
the H(p, q) test rejects the null of deterministic cointegration at the 5% significance level, while
accepting the null of stochastic cointegration, which implies that the cointegrating vector removes
the stochastic trend only. Therefore, we estimate the cointegrating vector with a time trend and
an intercept. The substitution eﬀect of lt−1 was present with the exception of the case of raw data
with no time trend. However, wt−1 has a sign that cannot be theoretically justified when a time
trend is included. Therefore, “Dirty Altruism” model does not have convincing empirical support.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Evidence in favor of the “substitution” hypothesis is very strong, and the magnitude of the observed
eﬀect is suﬃciently large to suggest an important role for this phenomenon in procurement reform
eﬀorts. Unfortunately, the apparent sizes of the eﬀect vary between the model estimated using
seasonally-adjusted data, and that using the raw data. In both cases, however, the eﬀect is large
enough to be significant for procurement reform eﬀorts that are predicated on increasing cadaveric
donation.
Using the unadjusted data, a 10% increase in cadaver transplants in one quarter leads, on aver-
age, to a drop of about 5% in next quarter living donor transplants. Converting these percentages
to raw numbers using end of sample values for the numbers of grafts, we see that an increase of
matrix. We also use VAR prewhitening method as recommended by Andrews and Monahan (1992).
31The H(p, q) test has asymptotic χ2 distribution with q − p degrees of freedom. The test statistic diverges to
infinity under the alternative hypothesis. Therefore, the test is consistent.
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around 320 kidney transplants from deceased donors in one quarter will, on average, lead to an
eighty operation reduction in living donor transplants in the subsequent quarter. Thus, the expan-
sion of cadaver operations is partially undermined by a later reduction in living donor grafts, the
loss amounting to about 25% of the initial increase in organs. This is a considerable eﬀect.
Circumstances appear even worse when the estimates obtained from seasonally adjusted data
are used. In this case, the initial 10% increase in deceased donor operations results in a 13% decline
in later live donor grafts, or around 210 operations. Thus, the initial increase in deceased donor
kidneys or 320 organs produces only around 110 additional transplants, other things equal.32 If this
estimate is even remotely correct, there are strong reasons to conclude that procurement initiatives
that target increased deceased donor organ supply are highly unlikely to produce results anywhere
near their stated goals. Indeed, the pursuit of such approaches may be detrimental to patient
populations, if their implementation slows adoption of alternative reforms that do not suﬀer from
this profound defect.
In contrast, evidence in favor of the “dirty altruism” phenomenon is not so clear. A part of the
diﬃculty lies with the diﬀerent stochastic properties the model given by (3) exhibits. As mentioned
earlier, we find evidence that the cointegrating vector for this process removes the stochastic trend
only, which is ordinarily taken to mean one must estimate the relationship including a time trend
variable (and a constant term). When we do so, we do find eﬀects that are mostly consistent
with the dirty altruism hypothesis: increases in living donations in one quarter reduce cadaver
transplants in the next, although the magnitude of the eﬀects is smaller than in the substitution
case. For example, using the trended model and the unadjusted data, we find that a 10% increase
in living donations in one quarter leads to a reduction in subsequent cadaver donations of about
2%. Using seasonally adjusted data, this eﬀect is estimated to be about 4%. On the other hand, the
results for the eﬀects of changes in the waiting list are curious and suggest that caution be applied
in forming conclusions. The waiting list either appears to reduce cadaveric donation, or else to have
no significant eﬀect. The first case is quite implausible, but the second is reasonable if one assumes
32We ignore the later eﬀects arising from changes in the size of the waiting list.
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that the decisions of donor families are largely unaﬀected by the size of the need for organs (since,
perhaps, that need is so great that modest changes in need are irrelevant), and that physicians and
medical staﬀ do not adjust their eﬀorts in response to waiting list movements. Accepting all of this,
one can credibly claim that the data is consistent with the dirty altruism hypothesis. Unlike the
case of the substitution conjecture, however, dirty altruism is a somewhat more nebulous concept,
and it is unrealistic to expect that a time series analysis of the sort presented here will be a definitive
test of it. However, our findings suggest at a minimum that further investigation, perhaps at the
micro level, is warranted.
On balance, it is likely and plausible that the supplies of kidneys for transplantation are in-
tertemporally related, and that these relationships are quite unlikely to be helpful to eﬀorts to
reduce the costs of the severe shortage of organs for transplant. Reform eﬀorts in U.S. kidney pro-
curement have historically been proposed and managed from within the medical community. The
ODBC, and similar programs in Eurotransplant and elsewhere, are examples of this circumstance.
One unfortunate consequence of this orientation is that such programs view an additional organ
obtained at time t as representing one additional transplant on net. Yet, recruitment of donors,
and the donation decision, are made within an environment of severe and ongoing shortage caused
by a lack of any mechanism to provide material incentives to donors or their families. In such
conditions, one should expect various non-market factors to aﬀect organ procurement to a degree
unimaginable in a normal market setting.
Thus, the finding of a relatively significant substitution eﬀect is intuitive, though disturbing.
This eﬀect is clearly large enough to matter. The existence of this eﬀect, if confirmed elsewhere,
should become a topic for discussion in the ongoing debate on procurement reform. Any proposal
that does not address this phenomenon is likely to fall far short of its advertized potential.
“Dirty altruism”, however, remains primarily conjectural. It is probable that any aggregated
time series analysis will be too crude to uncover this eﬀect. One should perhaps turn to micro
surveys of donor families to resolve this issue, and that task remains undone.
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Table 1. Unit Root Test Results for the Null of Nonstationarity 
 
Raw Data  ctZ   
tc
tZ
,  
tl   -1.702 (0.425)  -3.079 (0.122) 
tc   -2.421 (0.141)  -5.728 (0.000) 
tw   -6.413 (0.000)  -1.340 (0.867) 
     
tlΔ   -7.332 (0.000)  -7.307 (0.000) 
tcΔ   -8.968 (0.000)  -8.884 (0.000) 
twΔ   -5.988 (0.000)  -8.588 (0.000) 
    
Seasonally Adjusted Data ctZ   
tc
tZ
,  
tl   -2.282 (0.181)  -0.144 (0.993) 
tc   -1.296 (0.625)  -3.993 (0.015) 
tw   -5.974 (0.000)  -1.198 (0.901) 
     
tlΔ   -6.443 (0.000)  -7.000 (0.000) 
tcΔ   -9.413 (0.000)  -9.316 (0.000) 
twΔ   -3.216 (0.025)  -4.812 (0.002) 
Note: i) ctZ  and 
tc
tZ
,  denote the Phillips-Perron t  test statistics when an intercept and when an 
intercept and linear time trend are included, respectively. ii) p  values are in parentheses. iii) 
Standard errors are corrected nonparametrically by the quadratic spectral kernel with automatic 
bandwidth selection. iv) All variables are measured in natural logarithms. v) Alternative unit root 
tests for 1−tc  and 1−tw  provided evidence in favor of nonstationarity overall. 
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Table 2. Canonical Cointegrating Regressions and Cointegration Test Results 
 
Raw Data     Estimates 
Constant  0.944 (1.227) 
1−tc   -0.513 (0.223) 
1−tw   0.953 (0.058) 
   
)1,0(H   0.271 (0.603) 
)2,1(H   0.047 (0.829) 
)3,1(H   2.383 (0.304) 
   
Seasonally Adjusted Data    Estimates 
Constant  4.821 (1.308) 
1−tc   -1.368 (0.236) 
1−tw   1.212 (0.058) 
   
)1,0(H   1.347 (0.246) 
)2,1(H   0.275 (0.600) 
)3,1(H   0.542 (0.763) 
Note: i) Starndard errors for the CCR estimates and p  values for the ),( qpH  test statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ii) )1,0(H  tests the null of deterministic cointegration while ),1( qH  
tests the null of stochastic cointegration without the determinstic cointegration restriction. iii) 
The quadratic spectral kernel with automatic bandwidth selection was used to obtain the long-run 
variance matrix. 
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Table 3. Canonical Cointegrating Regressions and Cointegration Test Results: An 
Alternative Specification 
 
Raw Data     Estimates  Estimates 
Constant  5.629 (0.703) 11.90 (1.169) 
Trend  NA 0.016 (0.003) 
1−tl     0.033 (0.195) -0.174 (0.085) 
1−tw     0.179 (0.190) -0.312 (0.139) 
    
)1,0(H   6.322 (0.012)
)2,1(H     0.256 (0.613)
)3,1(H     2.426 (0.297)
    
Seasonally Adjusted Data    Estimates  Estimates 
Constant  4.337 (0.686) 10.87 (0.923) 
Trend  NA 0.015 (0.002) 
1−tl   -0.461 (0.192) -0.437 (0.086) 
1−tw   0.629 (0.188)  -0.037 (0.125) 
  
)1,0(H   7.620 (0.006)
)2,1(H     0.423 (0.516)
)3,1(H     0.955 (0.620)
Note: i) Starndard errors for the CCR estimates and p  values for the ),( qpH  test statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ii) )1,0(H  tests the null of deterministic cointegration while ),1( qH  
tests the null of stochastic cointegration without the deterministic cointegration restriction. iii) 
The quadratic spectral kernel with automatic bandwidth selection was used to obtain the long-run 
variance matrix. 
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 Figure 1. Kidney Transplant Data 
 
(a) Raw Data 
 
 
 
(b) Seasonally Adjusted Data 
 
 
